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I. INTRODUCTION 
On May 20, 2002, seventeen economists, including five Nobel 
laureates, presented an amicus curiae brief discussing the economics 
of copyright extension in support of the petitioners in  Eldred v. 
Ashcroft, a Supreme Court case challenging the constitutionality of 
the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act of 1998 (“CTEA”).
1 
The economists’ amicus brief was u nusual in several respects, not 
least in that it brought together a group of economists almost as nota-
ble for its diversity of opinion (spanning the ideological spectrum 
from Kenneth Arrow to Milton Friedman) as for its academic distinc-
tion.
2 
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When such a distinguished and broad panel of economists appears 
to agree on a subject, it would be reasonable to assume that they re-
flect the profession’s views as a whole. Further, it would be natural to 
expect that any document signed by these economists would meet the 
same exacting standards normally associated with their works. Also, 
that this document was used in an important legal matter reasonably 
merits an even higher degree of confidence in its integrity. In short, 
readers would have every reason to b elieve  that the arguments set 
forth in this document are sound down to the smallest details. Yet this 
is not the case.  
The Eldred case is now resolved; the Supreme Court has found 
against the petitioners. Nevertheless, active debates in both the legal 
and economic literatures raise questions regarding the particulars of 
copyright law and its underlying principles. Thus, the issues raised in 
the economists’ brief remain important. Critics of copyright are mak-
ing bold claims,  in some instances even  advocating its a bolition.
3 
Scholars in the fields of law and economics will continue to address 
the economics of copyright duration in the foreseeable future, so it is 
important that they understand the imperfections in the economists’ 
brief. This Article provides a counterweight to the amicus brief, iden-
tifying some points the economists ignored, clarifying some discus-
sions they did not quite get right, and providing data that runs counter 
to some assumptions they made.  
II. BACKGROUND 
The CTEA has two major provisions: First, it extends the term of 
copyright protection for a given work from fifty years after the a u-
thor’s death to seventy years after the author’s death, or, in the case of 
institutional authors, from seventy-five to ninety-five years.
4 Second, 
it applies this extension retroactively to works produced prior to its 
enactment.  
The CTEA was criticized vigorously from a number of perspec-
tives, but most forcefully from an active academic community advo-
cating expansion of an “information commons.”
5 Eldred v. Ashcroft 
became one of the vehicles for this opposition to copyright extension 
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and became a cause celebre in the online and academic communities. 
The litigation was coordinated at the Berkman Center for Internet and 
Society and argued before the Supreme Court by Lawrence Lessig, a 
leading advocate for expansion of the public domain. 
Eric Eldred publishes literary works on the Internet that have en-
tered the public domain. The CTEA prevented certain works from 
entering the public domain that he intended to provide on his website. 
Eldred claimed that the CTEA was unconstitutional on two grounds: 
First, he argued that it violated the Patent and Copyright Clause of the 
Constitution, which specifies that patents and copyrights are provided 
for a limited time and that they are authorized in order to promote the 
“Progress of  Science and the useful  Arts.”
6 Second, Eldred claimed 
that the CTEA was a violation of free speech. The Supreme Court has 
now ruled on the case, rejecting Eldred’s claims.  
While legal briefs  do not a lways provide  balanced views, the 
prominence of the Eldred economists appears to lend their brief sub-
stantial credibility. Without appropriate scrutiny, their brief could be 
taken by scholars and the general public as expressing the definitive 
view on the costs and benefits of copyright. This Article argues not 
that the CTEA extensions are clearly efficient, but that the case is not 
as one-sided as the economists’ brief suggests. 
There are important aspects of the economics of copyright that 
are ignored or not fully considered by the Eldred economists. They 
overlook factors, such as the elasticity of supply of creative  works, 
which might reverse their conclusion about the impact of copyright 
extension on the creation of new works. They neglect the possibility 
that network effects in the market for derivative works might make a 
copyright commons inefficient, independent of any impact on supply. 
Finally, they avoid the difficult empirical work needed to support their 
conclusion. 
III. BASIC POINTS IN THE BRIEF 
The amicus brief makes two points: 
(1) The portion of the law making the copyright extension retro-
active makes little economic sense.  The Constitution  provides for 
copyright to provide incentives for authors to create. Yet there can be 
no incentive impact when copyright is extended on items that have 
already been created under a previous copyright regime.  
(2) Extending copyright from life plus fifty years to life plus sev-
enty years affects  creation only through incremental revenues that 
accrue many years in the future. The impact of these incremental 
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revenues on present values is so small that it can have little incentive 
effect.  Copyright extension brings about incremental deadweight 
losses that are incurred far in the future and discounted heavily. A l-
though both factors are likely to be very small, the Eldred economists 
argue that copyright should not be extended, because copyright i m-
poses current costs on the creators of new copyrighted items who re-
use old material in their new works.  
This Article agrees with the Eldred economists on the first point, 
if the analysis is restricted to incentives to create. It argues at length 
below, however, that there are other important considerations that 
might reverse this conclusion. The economists’ second point is not as 
clear-cut and is incompletely explored in the brief. The following sec-
tions consider each of these points in reverse order. Finally, the Arti-
cle presents data relevant to the evaluation of copyright extension. 
IV. NEW WORKS: COMPARISONS OF COSTS AND BENEFITS 
The optimal length for copyright is not something that anyone can 
define with certainty. Although there have been claims in the litera-
ture that the optimal length is so short that copyright is unnecessary, 
there has been very little recent and serious examination of this issue.
7 
Putting aside for now the matter of efficient management of existing 
works, how much can be said about the efficiency of copyright exten-
sion?  
To make a full determination of the costs and benefits of copy-
right extension, economists need to know more about these markets 
than they currently do. Economists are far from alone in this igno-
rance; the information requirements are severe. The data that econo-
mists would need, but do not have, include (1) the number and value 
of new works created as a result of extensions of copyright duration 
(i.e., the elasticity of supply of creative works and the surplus created 
by additional works); (2) the reduction of surplus for reproductions of 
copyrighted materials under extended copyright, relative to the sur-
plus that would be generated if copyright protection were less lengthy 
(i.e., the increased unnecessary deadweight losses). The general struc-
ture of the tradeoff between creation and use is well known. Neverthe-
less, commentators rarely consider a detailed construction of the 
values they compare. This Article presents such a construction. First, 
it identifies a shortcut that the economists took that caused them to 
understate the potential benefit of copyright extension. Next, it argues 
that a portion of the “deadweight loss” that is identified in the monop-
oly model of copyright is properly understood as a necessary cost of 
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providing incentives for creation. This discussion sets the stage for 
presenting a diagrammatic model of the market for creative works. 
Using that model, this Article illustrates an instance in which copy-
right extension is beneficial. The model also permits identification of 
the various factors that one must account for to assess properly the 
merits of copyright extension. 
A. The Gains and Losses from Extending Copyright 
The  Eldred economists use  a shortcut to describe the benefits 
from an extension of copyright — they talk about the additional royal-
ties generated by the extension. With such payments far in the future, 
the present value of extending copyright from, say, ninety to one hun-
dred years, is likely to be very small. The Eldred economists empha-
size the small present value of additional payments to authors in order 
to suggest that these payments can have only very limited effects on 
the creation of additional works. The benefits to society, however, are 
not the same as the present value of payments going to the copyright 
owners.
8  
Yet small increases in payment need not have small impacts on 
the creation of additional works. There is a possibility that for some 
authors, in some range of income and propensity to create, a small 
increase in present value could make an important difference in crea-
tive output, perhaps because they reach a point where they switch to 
full-time writing.
9 
At the conceptual level adopted by the amicus brief, it is certainly 
possible that there might be many potential authors with similar op-
portunity costs who, at the current copyright length, are on the margin 
of writing books. Figure 1 presents a very tight distribution of oppor-
tunity costs for authors. Even a trivial increase in the present value of 
royalty payments, such as the increase from royalties R to royalties S, 
might lead to a substantial increase in the number of works if the 
costs-of-creation distribution is dense at those magnitudes. If this is 
the case, small increases in payments from an expansion of copyright 
might  result in large increases in the number of  
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creative works, which in turn produces significant social benefits.
10 
Thus, the Eldred economists’ focus on the royalty streams is in-
correct. They should have focused instead on the impact of copyright 
changes on the value of forthcoming works. Section C will demon-
strate that this error is not harmless. First, however, the next section 
reviews briefly the economic impacts of changes in the term of copy-
right. 
B. Productive and Unproductive Deadweight Loss 
Calling a deadweight loss “productive” might seem oxymoronic. 
However, some deadweight losses serve a useful function if they are 
unavoidable consequences of an incentive system for which there is 
no better alternative. Copyright engenders a deadweight loss as a by-
product of the incentives to create that it provides. A system of private 
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We also assume that the new works do not decrease the surplus generated from older works. 
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the increased surplus from these new works comes at the expense of decreased surplus for 
works that would otherwise have been consumed in place of the new works. 
Opportunity Cost of Writing  R S 
 Figure 1: Distribution of Authors’ Costs 
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ownership providing the incentive for creation cannot give a reward to 
the creator without also having an apparent deadweight loss in the 
consumption market.
11  
While it is misleading to refer to a copyright as equivalent to a 
monopoly, the monopoly model is the easiest to apply and is the stan-
dard vehicle  illustrating these issues.
12  Moreover, the monopoly 
model is the framework for the a rguments in the amicus brief. When 
the following text refers to “books,” readers should note that “books” 
stand in for any creative work.  
Figure 2 is the standard textbook treatment of monopoly. Assume 
it represents the market for reproductions of a particular book title for 
some period of time. The demand for this title lasts for multiple time 
periods, each identical to the first. 
The perfectly competitive solution is a price of Pc and quantity 
Qc, which yields no profit in the reproduction market with which to 
pay the creator of the title. This maximizes the surplus in the repro-
duction market (the sum of areas 1–5) for this title. However, the title 
will not be produced if the creator requires a positive payment to in-
duce creation, which implies that no surplus at all will occur without 
some copyright protection. This is one of the problems Arrow identi-
fies in his classic 1962 article.
13 
Though it is not ideal, a copyright provision that results in a mo-
nopoly output level still is likely to produce a positive value for soci-
ety compared to no production at all. If copyright induces creation of 
works, society benefits from the production of copies of this title in 
the amount of 1+2+3+4, less the fixed costs of creation. Area 5 is 
normally called a deadweight loss, because one imagines that in a  
competitive market, it would be consumer surplus.
14 However, being 
able to imagine an improvement is not the same as being able to bring 
it about, as Demsetz points out in his classic response to Arrow.
15 
Once a  copyright regime is adopted as the mechanism to stimulate 
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13. See Kenneth J. Arrow, Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for Inven-
tion,  in THE RATE AND DIRECTION OF  INVENTIVE ACTIVITY: ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL 
FACTORS 609 (R. Nelson ed., 1962).  
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15. See Harold Demsetz,  Information and Efficiency: Another Viewpoint, 12  J.L. & 




production of creative works, area 5 is no longer a feasible component 
of the surplus and thus is not really a deadweight loss. Area 5 can be 
thought of as a “productive” deadweight loss, or the cost of copyright, 
since it is required in order to generate any surplus at all.  
The disagreement between Demsetz and Arrow largely hinged on 
defining the term “efficient.” Was the efficient output the theoretical 
ideal, as Arrow suggested, or was it the best that could be actually 
achieved, as Demsetz proposed? Although the Authors b elieve that 
Demsetz won that point, this Article does not need to answer that 
question for the purpose of evaluating copyright length. Once  one 
accepts copyright as the mechanism to provide incentives for creative 
works, and agrees that all books are given the same copyright term, 
then the “productive” deadweight losses are best understood as irrele-
vant to welfare considerations, since there is no other manner in 
which they could become part of the surplus within the confines of the 
chosen copyright mechanism. 
The analysis further suggests that deadweight losses need to be 
treated carefully in a determination of the optimal copyright duration. 
For example, if one were to adopt a methodology of comparing the 
gains to the losses when extending copyright, a p roper cost-benefit 
analysis would not contrast the sum of areas 1 through 4 with area 5, 
since area 5 is not a loss. In other words, even if area 5 were larger 
than the sum of areas 1 through 4, it would be incorrect to conclude 
that society would be better off not having this good produced at all. 
Of course, this diagram now illustrates gains (of copyright exten-
sion) with no balancing losses. How then could one arrive at any op-
timal length of copyright less than infinity? The answer is that once a 
creator has received sufficient payment to generate creation, any fur-
D 
MR 
1  2 
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ther payment is unnecessary. Therefore, any further deadweight losses 
are no longer productive and are thus unnecessary. 
If the creator receives a payment in the first period (the sum of ar-
eas 3 and 4) that fully covers the cost of creation, then, in the second 
period, area 5 is an old-fashioned deadweight loss. In this second pe-
riod, the cost of copyright extension is not mitigated by a balancing 
benefit, since the author would have created the book anyway, based 
only on first period revenues.  
Who would argue that all deadweight losses should be treated 
alike? Unfortunately, such a conclusion might occur to the casual 
reader of the economists’ amicus brief, which states:  
 
First, the CTEA [Copyright Term Extension Act of 
1998] extends the period during which a copyright 
holder determines the quantity produced of a work, 
and thus increases the inefficiency from above-cost 
pricing by lengthening its duration. With respect to 
the term extension for new works, the present value 
of the additional cost is small, just as the present 
value of incremental benefits is small.
16 
The Eldred economists talk about additional costs from extending the 
term of copyright, but neglect to explain how these costs are calcu-
lated, save for a brief discussion of the harm brought about by the 
monopoly restrictions on quantity. They make no attempt to distin-
guish those deadweight losses that are productive (i.e., necessary to 
bring about additional creative works) from those that are not.  
Even more troublesome is their claim that the present value of 
additional benefits is necessarily small. The parallel construction be-
tween the benefits and costs in the italicized sentence incorrectly im-
plies that both benefits and costs occur far into the future, which leads 
to their being heavily discounted and thus small. The logic is correct 
for the increased costs of copyright e xtension, which only begin to 
occur when the current copyright term expires, but it is not true for all 
benefits. The present value of additional revenues to authors might be 
heavily discounted (and small), but this need not imply that the impact 
of these revenues on the creation of works is small, since evaluators 
need to know something about the elasticity of creation before making 
any such statements. Further, the benefits from any additional creative 
works begin to accrue immediately; they are not discounted far into 
the future, the way that incremental revenues and i ncremental costs 
are.  
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C. An Example of Beneficial Copyright Extension 
Figure 3 shows how copyright extension might lead to large bene-
fits even with a lengthy original term of copyright. This diagram as-
sumes that all titles have equal costs of reproduction and equal value 
to consumers, but have different costs of writing. The horizontal axis 
has new titles, aligned in increasing order by the cost of creation. All 




The opportunity cost of creation is represented by the upward-
sloping “Cost of Writing” curve. This example assumes a linear curve 
to indicate a constant increase in titles as payments to authors i n-
crease. Books will be written as long as the (discounted) rewards to 
the author are greater than the costs of writing the book, where writing 
costs are stipulated to include editing, design, and any other fixed 
costs of creation that are avoided by follow-on publishers. These costs 
of writing are not included in the calculation of consumers’ and pro-
ducers’ surpluses in the reproduction market, which are modeled in 
this diagram. The model assumes that the market for publishers’ ac-
quisition of titles is perfectly competitive, so that the author captures 
the entire producers’ surplus in the market for the reproductions of a 
single title.  
Since each title is assumed to have identical values to consumers 
and identical costs of reproduction, the present value of the sum of 
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represented by a h orizontal line for any potential copyright regime. 
The ideal value of each title (e.g., perfect price discrimination by the 
publisher selling copies of titles, the present value of areas 1–5 in Fig-
ure  2) is represented by the highest horizontal line labeled 
PV[CS+PS]ideal. For any number of titles, the area under this line 
represents the potential value of the titles to society — that is, the total 
value of the titles if each were exploited to exhaust all possible gains 
from trade before the costs of creation are considered.  
T
* represents the optimal number of titles that would be produced 
in this ideal world, since all titles to the left have a potential surplus in 
the market for reproductions that is greater than the cost of writing the 
book, and all titles to the right have a creation cost greater than the 
potential surplus. 
In a world of copyright, the surplus in the reproduction market is 
less than ideal, however. Figure  3 represents two cases: an infinite 
copyright life (represented by 8 ) and a sixty year copyright life, indi-
cated by the subscripts. A lthough the extension of copyright length 
proposed by the CTEA was far less than infinity, this Article uses the 
assumption of infinite life for illustration.  
The present values of the realized total surplus (producer plus 
consumer surpluses) under the copyright regimes are shown in the 
diagram as PV[CS+PS]60 and PV[CS+PS]8 for a sixty year and infi-
nite copyright life, respectively. Assuming that the demand for each 
book title persists for more than sixty years, the present value of the 
total surplus in the reproduction market is less with an infinite copy-
right than with a sixty-year copyright since the reproduction market 
would never achieve its efficient (non-monopoly) output under an 
infinite copyright regime. The vertical difference between these two 
horizontal lines might be quite small. This is b ecause the surpluses 
after sixty years are highly discounted in present value terms, as the 
Eldred economists argued, although this Article draws them as having 
a non-negligible difference in value. 
The payments received by authors are the present values of the 
producer’s surplus in the reproduction market, and are reflected by 
horizontal lines PV[PS], with obviously smaller values than the total 
surplus.  
Next, how does a  change from a sixty-year term to an infinite 
term affect the market? The increase in unnecessary deadweight loss 
for the books that would have been written with a copyright length of 
sixty years (those books to the left of T60 in Figure 3) is given by the 
rectangle with the embedded spheres. This area reflects the lower sur-
pluses in the reproduction market that result from the increased life of 
the monopoly restriction (from sixty years to infinity). 
The change in the number of new titles depends on the additional 
reward received by authors and on the elasticity of creation with re-446   Harvard Journal of Law & Technology  [Vol. 18 
 
spect to reward. Figure 3 assumed a constant elasticity throughout, 
although Figure 1 illustrated a case where the elasticity was particu-
larly large at the original copyright length.
17 A greater elasticity would 
increase the value from copyright extension.  The value to s ociety 
from the increase in titles is given by the cross-hatched area, which is 
drawn to be larger than the harm from the u nnecessary d eadweight 
loss. In this example, it is clear that an infinite copyright is better than 
a sixty-year copyright. This is a straightforward possibility that is 
short-changed by the Eldred economists.  
Note: (1) that the optimal number of titles in Demsetz’ sense un-
der either copyright regime is greater than the actual number of titles, 
because authors only receive part of the surplus, and (2) that the opti-
mal number of titles declines as copyright term increases, because 
total surplus decreases. Note as well that the optimal number of titles 
is always less than the ideal number of titles (in Arrow’s sense), be-
cause the total potential surpluses are not realized under any real-
world copyright regime.  
The full benefits from copyright extension include the consumer 
and producer surpluses, starting immediately and continuing into the 
future, resulting from any additional works generated by the copyright 
extension. These benefits are not all highly discounted. It is these full 
benefits — not the relatively minor incremental revenues that the El-
dred economists discussed — that must be traded off against the addi-
tional deadweight losses that occur far in the future.
18  
A correct assessment of copyright extension balances the present 
value of the surpluses generated by the new works resulting from the 
copyright extension against the heavily discounted, additional unnec-
essary deadweight losses for those works that would be created in the 
absence of the extension.  
Finally, there is the question of how realistic the construction of 
Figure 3 might be. That depends on many factors. In the real world, 
how dense is the distribution of opportunity costs otherwise portrayed 
in Figure 1? Where in that distribution are the points representing pre-
extension and extended copyright length and what are the resulting 
elasticities of supply? How is the surplus divided between authors and 
readers? The assumption in Figure 3 that all titles are of ex post equal 
value is clearly false. Are the more valuable titles likely to get pro-
duced first? Without additional research, the Eldred economists were 
not in a position to state whether the current copyright length is too 
long or too short.  
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V. RETROACTIVE EXTENSION OF COPYRIGHT TERM 
The seventeen economists’ claim regarding retroactive extension 
(point (2) in Part III above) appears obvious, because lengthening the 
term of copyright can have no effect on the size or quality of the body 
of creative works that existed at the time that the CTEA was enacted. 
However, lengthening the term of copyright increases the price for 
using already-created materials that would otherwise move into the 
public domain. This price elevation results in the monopoly dead-
weight loss that occurs where intellectual property is priced above 
reproduction cost. Since these costs are not balanced by any new crea-
tions, the retroactive extension of copyright is clearly socially ineffi-
cient.  
The  Eldred economists thus claim that the argument regarding 
retroactive copyright extension is completely one-sided. However, 
there are certain features of copyright law that the economists ignored 
in their brief, inflating their estimation of the costs of copyright. Fur-
thermore, there are social benefits to copyright extension. Therefore, 
the situation is not as dire as the economists predicted: the costs do 
not clearly outweigh the benefits.  
The amicus brief does acknowledge the possibility that such after-
the-fact extensions of copyright might increase the incentives to create 
for future authors who may expect the same treatment in any subse-
quent copyright e xtension. They regard this as a minor influence, 
however, and this Article agrees.
19  
A. Efficiency of Ownership 
The political fight over the CTEA appears largely to have been 
about its impact on already existing works. Indeed, potential revenues 
in 2110 are probably not a big incentive for Marshall Mathers or Sha-
nia Twain to crank out CDs. However, the rights to derivative works 
are an important matter to current owners of aged works and to non-
owners, such as Mr. Eldred, who would now like to use these aged 
works. Public choice considerations nicely predict the players in the 
recent controversy — on both sides, they are parties with interests in 
old works. These interests are worth pursuing because they are not 
discounted by seventy, eighty, or one hundred years.  
Eldred is aggrieved because he is unable to republish works that 
were written in the 1920s. In support of the CTEA, amicus briefs were 
submitted by various well-known owners of mature copyrights, such 
as Dr. Seuss Enterprises, Allene White (owner of E.B. White’s copy-
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rights in Stuart Little and Charlotte’s Web), and Barbara and Made-
line Bemelmans (owner of Ludwig Bemelmans’ copyrights in the 
Madeline series).  
The issue is management of existing creative works. The econo-
mists’ brief considers only the monopoly deadweight losses — one 
side of the a rgument — and concludes that all the weight is against 
extension. Another issue well-known to economists is not noted in the 
brief:  open access is not a universally preferable way to manage a 
resource.
20 The tragedy of the commons is thought not to hold for 
non-rivalrous goods (i.e., the intellectual property i tself), since  the 
reading of a story by one person does not prevent others from reading 
it as well.
21 It is possible, however, that one person’s ownership of a 
copy of a book might alter the utility of another person’s ownership, 
or that one person’s creation of a derivative work based on the book 
might alter the value of another’s derivative work. There are several 
reasons why consumers might want to circumscribe others’ access to 
intellectual property through copyright law.  
The Authors are certainly not the first to note a stewardship role 
in intellectual property protection. Edmund Kitch argues that patent is 
better understood as a claim-staking system rather than as a monop-
oly, allowing efficient exploitation of a technological realm.
22 In a 
recent paper, William Landes and Richard Posner elaborate on the 
advantages of copyright ownership, noting the possibility of excessive 
or inappropriate uses of intellectual properties and the role of copy-
right in avoiding the common access problem.
23  
1. The Possibility of Misuse 
Movies, among other derivative works, are large, risky invest-
ments that would be made more risky in the absence of the exclusivity 
                                                                                                    
20. The closest the brief comes to mentioning this issue is their acknowledgement that 
extending copyright might increase the copyright owners’ incentives to invest in improve-
ments to the creative work. Akerlof et al., supra note 1, at 9. The amici mostly dismiss this 
as an issue, noting that “a twenty-year copyright extension will have little or no incremental 
effect.” Id. Misuse or excessive activity in the creation of derivatives does not appear in 
their discussion, nor does any role of copyright in addressing such problems.  
21. See Denis S. Karjala, Statement of Copyright and Intellectual Property Law Profes-
sors in Opposition to H.R. 604, H.R. 2589, and S. 505, The Copyright Term Extension Act 
9 (Jan. 28, 1998), available at 
http://homepages.law.asu.edu/%7Edkarjala/OpposingCopyrightExtension/leg-
mats/1998Statement.html.  
22. See Edmund W. Kitch, The Nature and Function of the Patent System, 20 J.L. & 
ECON. 265, 266 (1977). 
23. William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Indefinitely Renewable Copyright, 70 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 471, 485 (2003). Landes and Posner discuss the possibility of copyright exter-
nalities, both technological and pecuniary. In turn, they are reacting to a statement in a brief 
by a group of intellectual property law professors that declares: “There can be no overgraz-
ing of intellectual property, however, because intellectual property cannot be destroyed or 
even diminished by consumption.” Karjala, supra note 21.  No. 2]  Seventeen Economists  449 
 
that copyright law provides. Absent copyright protection, others have 
every incentive to produce further derivative works. As an example, 
The Grinch, made in 2000, cost over $125 million to produce. How 
would the prospects for the movie be affected if just before its release, 
the Grinch character suddenly appeared in pornographic movies or 
advertising for cigarettes, altering the public’s view of the character? 
As rational actors, motion picture executives would anticipate this 
situation and possibly might not make the movie in the first place. The 
copyright owner’s role is similar to the private owner of a natural re-
source that can be subject to crowding. In both cases, the owner tries 
to prevent dissipation of value through misuse of an asset. A rational 
owner would approve  derivative projects that maximize his or her 
profits. Copyright policy must balance beneficial restrictions that con-
stitute stewardship over resources against standard monopoly losses. 
There are, of course, many expensive derivative works that are 
based upon creations entirely in the public domain. The question is 
whether they are produced as regularly or as well as they would be if 
they were protected by copyright. Further, one must consider whether 
they are produced under greater secrecy, raising their costs, in order to 
protect themselves from contemporaneous imitators. This is an e m-
pirical question to which economists do not yet have the answer. 
Malicious or offensive derivative uses of some creative works 
might seriously diminish their value without a sufficient offset in the 
form of public benefit.
24 Of course, the law accepts some damage to 
the value of creative works when they are subject to parody or criti-
cism. However, these fair-use exceptions to copyright protection exist 
because they clearly serve a purpose that is expected, in the aggregate, 
to pass a cost-benefit test.  
2. Snob, Veblen, and Aesthetic Network Effects 
A second concern for efficient management of intellectual prop-
erty deals with a particular type of network effect. As currently used, 
the term “network effects” is almost exclusively associated with posi-
tive effects — each user’s utility increases with the number of users. 
But, as  congestion externalities show, network effects can also be 
negative.
25 One of the earliest and most original treatments of network 
effects (although that term was not yet in use) was the paper by Har-
vey Leibenstein, who considered both positive effects (i.e., “band-
wagon”) and negative effects ( i.e.,  “snob” and  “Veblen”).
26 Snob 
                                                                                                    
24. The existence of a “Madeline Does Dallas” might lead to some awkward questions 
during bedtime stories. 
25. See Stan J. Liebowitz & Stephen E. Margolis, Network Externality: An Uncommon 
Tragedy, J. ECON. PERSP., Spring 1994, at 133.  
26. Harvey Leibenstein, Bandwagon, Snob, and Veblen Effects in the Theory of Consum-
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effects occur when consumers derive more utility as the number of 
other users of the product decreases, the opposite of the current use of 
network effects.
27 Veblen effects occur when consumers derive addi-
tional utility from a product as its market price gets higher. 
Architectural works, which are protected by copyright, are i n-
structive examples of negative network efforts. Builders in housing 
developments usually offer a variety of elevations of houses of the 
same floor plan. The practice of building varied elevations cannot be a 
monopoly restriction to elevate price, since the restriction on any one 
design does not restrict the total output of a set of very good substi-
tutes. Yet, builders do vary designs and often enter contracts obligat-
ing them to do so. The production of different elevations does 
increase cost, relative to building the same design over and over 
again, but the total value of a development must increase by more 
than these additional costs, or builders would discontinue the practice. 
In tract developments, a builder’s ownership of a large number of lots 
may i nternalize t he negative network effect of visually identical 
houses. In other instances, a subdivision’s covenants and restrictions 
can internalize them.  And of course, copyright can internalize  this 
“aesthetic” network effect (to coin a new term).  
These are real external effects, not just pecuniary ones. Many 
consumers derive less utility if their house looks very similar to all the 
others in their subdivision. If the market could not internalize  con-
sumer preference for variety, total wealth would be reduced. The de-
cisions of individual consumers might lead to a lack of variety, since 
the harm to others from additional uses of a design does not directly 
enter the individual decision maker’s utility calculus. 
The scope of such external effects is quite large and underappre-
ciated. For example, the literature on resale price maintenance sug-
gests a  “demonstration” motive by manufacturers who try to keep 
retailers from charging too low a price.
28 Some retailers may not pro-
vide needed demonstration services, relying instead on free-riding on 
other retailers who do provide it, causing the service to disappear un-
der competitive pressures. An additional explanation, especially for 
those  cases where demonstrations seem unimportant, would be that 
some retailers do not provide enough of an exclusive aura about their 
products (snob effect), or some retailers might lower the price to a 
                                                                                                    
27. The term “snob” carries an unfortunate connotation that mischaracterizes many of 
these network effects. Ordinary consumers often evidence a preference for expressing indi-
viduality. An image may delight the eyes if it is seen every now and then, but it may seem 
absolutely banal if it appears on every telephone pole. 
28. See Lester G. Telser, Why Should Manufacturers Want Fair Trade?, 3 J.L. & ECON. 
86, 91 (1960). Since the manufacturer receives the same price from the retailer independent 
of the retailer’s price, it would appear that the manufacturer would be pleased to have the 
retailer increase total sales without the manufacturer needing to lower his price. Yet, there 
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level that distresses other consumers of the product (Veblen effect), in 
either case lowering the utility for all the other users. 
 Such external effects also might explain why competition does 
not lower the prices of high-end items (top-of-the-line automobiles, 
stereo equipment, appliances, etc.) which are known to have higher 
margins and yet where monopoly power appears to be missing. Com-
petitors with lower prices for equivalent products would not take cus-
tomers away from the higher-priced product, and competition would 
not reduce markups, if the customers derive utility from the fact that 
the original product is sold to a more exclusive clientele. Such exter-
nal effects can also explain why customers prefer diamonds to cubic 
zirconia.  
Within the world of copyrighted works, evidence of these aes-
thetic network effects is plentiful. The practice among artists of num-
bering prints and publicizing the total number in the series, with a 
promise not to increase the number of prints, might be a mere monop-
oly restriction, but it also might be a way of increasing the actual util-
ity that a consumer enjoys. Snob effects might help to explain why 
original paintings sell for so much more than almost perfect forgeries 
that seemingly provide the same visual experience.
29 These effects 
might help explain the behavior and existence of the designer clothing 
industry and the custom-home building industry. In all these cases, 
demand itself is a function of the number of users. Where these effects 
appear, they affect the shape of the demand curve — they are not 
simply movements along a demand curve.  
Where there are technological network effects such as these, it is 
important that these effects be internalized. Firms producing copies or 
derivatives of creative works after the copyright expires may be in the 
position of fisherman on an open access lake. They produce at their 
own private optima, not taking into account the effects that they have 
on other producers. Ownership can effectively manage these interac-
tions, and copyright provides that ownership. The difficulty, of 
course, is distinguishing between pecuniary and real (technological) 
effects. Internalizing pecuniary effects leads to monopoly; internaliz-
ing real effects leads to efficient levels of activity.  
These aesthetic network effects may be prevalent for some classes 
of creative works. They may be important for simple copies of visual 
works that are publicly displayed, musical and literary works that are 
used in advertising, and for decorative items. They may also be i m-
portant for derivative works of all sorts. At a minimum, one needs to 
know something about the empirical realities of these markets before 
                                                                                                    
29. Obviously, for works still under copyright, a forgery might sell for less, since it vio-
lates copyright. For the large number of works in the public domain, however, it is still the 
case that copies that can only be discerned by experts will not sell for as high a price as the 
original. 452   Harvard Journal of Law & Technology  [Vol. 18 
 
making pronouncements about the efficiency, or lack of efficiency, in 
the copyright law. 
B. The Costs to Current Creators of Derivative Works 
A  major portion of the economists’ Eldred brief is devoted to a 
purported increase in the costs of creation resulting from copyright 
extension. They claim that because creative works derive inspiration 
and form from the creative works of the past, copyright stifles new 
creation, and extended copyright stifles creation unnecessarily. Their 
discussion is largely misguided in that it fails to take account of some 
of the special features of copyright.  
The economists’ brief cites a seminal paper by Landes and Posner 
that notes the costs and benefits of copyright extension.
30 The econo-
mists’ brief is largely consistent with the first part of Landes and Pos-
ner, which presents a model of copyright, but it neglects a central 
purpose of their paper. Landes and Posner build a model of an abstract 
copyright law to illustrate the properties of an optimal level of protec-
tion, the determinants of that optimal level of protection, and the 
trade-off that exists at the optimum. They then use their model as a 
platform for explaining some of the specific features of actual copy-
right law. Their approach is summarized as follows: 
 
[V]arious doctrines of copyright law, such as the dis-
tinction between idea and expression and the fair use 
doctrine, can be understood as attempts to promote 
economic efficiency by balancing the e ffect of 
greater copyright protection —  in encouraging the 
creation of new works by reducing copying — 
against the effect of less protection — in encourag-
ing the creation of new works by reducing the cost of 
creating them.
31 
The economists’ discussion of the costs of derivative works takes 
no note of the moderating influences of these features of copyright. 
There is no question that creators of derivative works have the great-
est latitude, and therefore the lowest costs, where the works that they 
would employ are in the public domain. But the fair use exceptions 
and the distinction between the idea and the expression provide suffi-
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18 J. LEGAL STUD. 325, 347–61 (1989).  
31. Id. at 333. If this Article limited its attention to the creation of additional works, it 
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cient relief from copyright restrictions that a large share of creative 
reuses of protected works are permitted.
32  
This Article could paraphrase the Landes and Posner discussion 
of both the idea-expression distinction and fair use, and a lthough it 
might be a breach of academic etiquette, it would not be a copyright 
violation. There are two reasons: First, these matters are discussed in a 
number of places, so it would be difficult to establish that Landes and 
Posner were the source. Second, while  it would reflect the ideas in 
their discussion, it would not use their expression unless it constitutes 
a “lazy copy.”  
Copyright protects expression, not ideas. Many economists have 
seen It’s a Wonderful Life, the Jimmy Stewart movie classic, and have 
read The Choice, Russell Roberts’ treatment of free trade. Although 
Roberts uses the plot device of a man who must return to earth to earn 
his angel’s wings, his book does not infringe the movie’s copyright. 
Though clearly an i mportant creative element of the movie, the plot 
device is not protected by copyright. Television addicts will also note 
the flock of shows that followed the  Friends format or the current 
proliferation of Survivor-type shows. Artists do indeed draw on old 
themes, and they are allowed to do so. On the other hand, they are not 
allowed to incorporate details of copyrighted works. So the econo-
mists are correct in that copyright does raise artists’ costs — copyright 
forces artists to do some work themselves. However, since only spe-
cific expressions are protected, extensive parts of the culture are not, 
as is sometimes claimed, walled off from creative re-use. 
Fair use doctrine also includes important exemptions to copyright 
that further expand the legal reuses of existing works. An important 
example of fair use is parody, which allows works to be reused in cer-
tain kinds of creative transformations, such as comical parodies of 
books or movies using many recognizable details of the original work. 
A recent case that captured a great deal of public attention illus-
trates that even very extensive  borrowing from  a creative work can 
fall u nder fair use. Alice Randall’s novel,  The Wind Done Gone, 
prompted objections from the Margaret Mitchell Trust, owners of the 
rights to Gone with the Wind.
33 The Wind Done Gone uses the charac-
ters and plot elements from the earlier work, but views them from the 
perspective of the slaves who lived and worked on the plantation.
34 
                                                                                                    
32. Fair use is a defense against the claim of copyright infringement, and is often used to 
allow portions of copyrighted works to be copied when the copying is likely not to harm the 
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Economic Analysis of the Betamax Case and its Predecessors, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 1600 
(1982).  
33. See Houghton Mifflin, The Wind Done Gone: Questions and Answers About This 
Dispute,  at  http://www.houghtonmifflinbooks.com/features/randall_url/qandas.shtml  (last 
visited Mar. 15, 2005).  
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Although an initial injunction delayed publication, the Eleventh Cir-
cuit subsequently found that this new perspective both transformed 
the original work substantially and did so to provide important criti-
cism.
35 Here again, copyright did not bar use of important elements of 
our culture that were essential to a creative work of social criticism. 
Critics of copyright deplore that Ms. Randall was forced to defend her 
fair use in court, but the fact that copyright occasionally imposes legal 
costs is not a sufficient argument for curtailing it. Additionally, Ms. 
Randall could have told her story without so directly borrowing the 
particulars of Gone with the Wind and its reservoir of publicity and 
sentiment, although that might have limited the scope of her market. 
VI. WHAT DO ECONOMISTS KNOW ABOUT COPYRIGHT 
LENGTH? 
The CTEA’s extension of the copyright term occurs far into the 
future, relative to the time when a copyrighted work is created. What 
are the odds that the extension will have any consequence for a crea-
tive work? To answer this, one must know something about the lon-
gevity of copyrighted works.  
The amicus brief reports a Congressional Research Service study 
that finds that only a small percentage of works copyrighted during 
the 1920s and 1930s and renewed in the 1950s and 1960s had com-
mercial value in 1998 (eleven percent of copyrights in books, twelve 
percent  in musical works, and  twenty-six percent  in motion pic-
tures).
36 It also reports that less than one percent of books had their 
copyrights renewed.
37 This interesting result can be read in a mislead-
ing fashion. Copyrighted works do not start life as equals. The great 
majority of copyrighted works never have much market value. It is 
well-known that a small percentage of titles account for a large share 
of sales of copyrighted materials.  
In the mid-1980s, Liebowitz conducted an unpublished examina-
tion of the longevity of titles, which examined the concentration of 
sales. In 1986, adult hardbound trade books and book club sales to-
gether totaled approximately $1.7 billion.
38 That year, there were ap-
proximately 25,000 new hardbound trade titles produced, in addition 
to the hundreds of thousands of old titles in that category.
39 Best-
                                                                                                    
35. See Suntrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 268 F.3d 1257 (11th Cir. 2001). 
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SERV., COPYRIGHT TERM EXTENSION: ESTIMATING THE ECONOMIC VALUES 6–14 (1998), 
available at http://countingcalifornia.cdlib.org/crs/pdf/98-144.pdf). 
37. RAPPAPORT, supra note 36, at 6.  
38. The Bowker Annual of Library and Book Trade Information 414 (33rd ed. 1988). 
Adult hardbound books numbered 1.025 billion and book clubs 0.698 billion.  
39. Id. at 403–05. There were 41,925 new titles in 1986, including both paperback and 
hardbound. Approximately 17,000 of those were new paperback titles. No. 2]  Seventeen Economists  455 
 
sellers for 1986, which numbered less than 200, therefore represented 
a small percentage of these titles. Yet, the top 124 best-sellers in 1987 
generated combined sales of approximately 35 million copies.
40 The 
average 1986 price of a hardcover book was thirty-two dollars.
41 
Thus, best-sellers were likely to have generated nearly $1 billion i n 
sales out of a total of $1.7 billion.
42 Note that this does not include 
sales of best-sellers from previous years that were still selling in rela-
tively large numbers. These numbers back up anecdotal evidence — 
that the distribution of book sales is very highly skewed toward the 
more successful book titles. 
One question, then, is the longevity of those titles that actually 
have significant market value and make up the majority of sales in the 
market. To address this question, Liebowitz constructed a small data 
set consisting of a sample of titles reviewed in Book Review Digest in 
the 1920s, along with best-sellers. Book Review Digest reviewed ap-
proximately twenty-five percent of new titles. Generally, these were 
the titles attracting the most attention, written by the more important 
authors and published by the better-known houses. Table 1 gives the 
number of these titles that were in print after fifty-eight years.  
 
Table 1: Life Expectancies of Titles 





Percent in Print 
After 58 Years 
All Books  236.00  97.00  41% 
Best-sellers  91.00  49.00  54% 
Non-best-sellers  145.00  48.00  33% 
 
More than half of the best-sellers in the sample remained in print 
for a long enough period of time that the 1976 extension to the copy-
right law would likely have affected the present value of future book 
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forming that an additional sixty-four titles sold approximately 150,000 copies each).  
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fiction dominated the bestseller sales, the number in the text might need to be adjusted 
downward, but would still have bestsellers representing a very large component of sales. 
42. This could be taken as evidence supporting the idea that optimal copyright length is 
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next best opportunity, then for two-thirds of the market, copyright would be longer than 
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sales.
43 Even for non-best-sellers, a third still survived after fifty-eight 
years, indicating that a fairly significant share of other  important 
books would likely be affected by changes in copyright law even 
when the copyright term is quite long. 
Table 2 presents a further breakdown of longevity by category of 
title. There clearly are large differences among titles in different cate-
gories which have the likelihood of remaining in print for fifty-eight 
years. For some categories, the number of books remaining in print 
for this period is quite large. 
 
Table 2: Percentage of Titles Surviving More Than 
Fifty-Eight Years 
Category  All Titles  Best Sellers 
Removed 
Academic  68%  68% 
Philosophical  52%  41% 
History  51%  43% 
Biography  49%  42% 
Religion  46%  40% 
Poetry  43%  40% 
Fiction  36%  40% 
Mystery  23%  16% 
Comedy  25%  0% 
Autobiography  19%  11% 
Art  17%  17% 
Travel  6%  6% 
Sports  0%  0% 
 
What is the importance of these findings for analyzing the Eldred 
case? They indicate that the inferences about depreciation rates of 
books drawn from overall survival rates are likely to be misleading. 
The great majority of books are obscure. They never had much market 
value, and their demise reflects this lack of viability more than it re-
flects depreciation. They are unlikely to have significant value in the 
public domain, just as they had insufficient value under copyright to 
keep them in print. However, for the small number of titles generating 
the lion’s share of economic value, life expectancy is rather long. Ex-
tending copyright might have only a small change in expected reve-
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nues for these books, but not because they have gone out of print or 
have lost commercial potential. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
It is amazing that copyright duration, a topic that has brought 
forth hardly any economic research, could bring together such a 
strong group of economists. Given both the ideological range and the 
distinction of this group, readers might well conclude that there is no 
other side to this issue. Copyright extension thus might seem to join 
rent control as one of very few things on which economists agree.  
Nevertheless, there is another side to the economics of copyright 
extension, different from the one put forward by this distinguished 
group. A more complete view requires consideration of the respon-
siveness of creative efforts to marginal incentives and the function of 
ownership of intellectual property beyond the incentive to create. A 
more nuanced view requires attention to the limitations in the exclu-
sionary aspect of copyright law. A more correct view requires an ex-
amination of empirical magnitudes that no one has fully undertaken. 